Is there a point where automation on the flight deck achieves the opposite of what was intended ?
Automatics fitted by one manufacturer has led to a perceived arrogance by them with regards to risk and training. This translates as an attitude crafted by 'supremacy automatics' for example stall recovery training is not necessary because our aeroplanes cannot stall. When one did the inability of the aircrew to recover this situation proved fatal.
Information systems like the Electronic Flight Bag can also hoodwink its users into believing misinformation, again with fatal consequences. As a member of the Air Safety Group in London I wrote a report on this very subject and then made a presentation to politicians and aviation experts and regulators, copies of which
can be read here: EFB Friend or Foe
and my presentations here: EFB Friend or Foe PACTS Presentation
Recommendations made in the report and at the presentation are now being considered by EASA and the CAA for inclusion in EASA AMC 20-25
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